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ABSTRACT
HANOVER COURTHOUSE: THE UNION'S TACTICAL
VICTORY AND STRATEGIC FAILURE
Jerry Joseph Coggeshall
Old Dominion University, 1999
Director: Dr. Harold S. Wilson
The Battle of Hanover Courthouse was the high water
mark of the Union's Peninsular Campaign: the battle was a
decisive Federal victory, but disjointed leadership by the
Union high command squandered the ensuing strategic
opportunities.

This research project will evaluate the

complex strategic situation which developed in the area of
Hanover Courthouse as the Union high command attempted to
reinforce the Army of the Potomac in its drive on Richmond
in May of 1862.

This topic has been neglected by historians

more concerned with larger battles that took place closer to
Richmond, or with Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson's campaign in
the Shenandoah Valley.

Yet, it was the Federal victory at

Hanover Courthouse that presented the Union high command
with the greatest opportunity to influence the overall
strategic situation in the Virginia theater in mid-1862.
The goal of this study will be to expose the strategic
opportunities which were lost to the Union at Hanover
Courthouse as a result of disjointed leadership.

To

accomplish this goal this study will provide an in-depth
analysis of the strategic issues which faced the Union and
Confederate leadership as they each sought to control the
area between Richmond and Fredericksburg in May of 1862.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

A

description of the engagement at Hanover Courthouse, which
was the climax of the strategic duel north of Richmond, will
be particularly important to this thesis.

The fulfillment

of this goal will provide a much needed assessment of a
critical phase of the war in Virginia.
In analyzing the Battle of Hanover Courthouse this
research proj ect will rely upon a wide variety of sources.
Primary documents will be used as much as possible; with
diaries, reports, and maps making up the bulk of such
sources.

Secondary sources will be employed mostly as an

overall guide in becoming more familiar with the general
details of this topic.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The Battle of Hanover Courthouse was the high water
mark of the Union's Peninsular Campaign of 1862.

This

battle, which occurred between Richmond and Fredericksburg,
was a substantial tactical victory for the Union.

However,

disjointed leadership by the Union high command squandered
the ensuing opportunity to bring about important strategic
results, and perhaps end the war.
Previous scholarship on the engagement at Hanover
Courthouse has been sparse.

There have been several

regimental histories that have discussed the battle, but
these works provide a perspective of the engagement that is
limited to the experiences of individual regiments.

Studies

of the Peninsular Campaign, the Union offensive in which
Hanover Courthouse occurred, have consistently relegated the
battle to footnote status in order to discuss more
thoroughly the dramatic events southeast of Richmond.

More

general evaluations of the 1862 Virginia campaigns have
likewise overlooked Hanover Courthouse in that they often
focus exclusively on either the fight for Richmond, or the
Shenandoah Valley Campaign.
This thesis will represent the first comprehensive
study directed at understanding the significance of the
The format for this thesis follows the style requirements of
Kate L. Turabian's A Manual for Writers of Term Papers.
Theses, and Dissertations (Sixth Edition).
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Battle of Hanover Courthouse. As the climax of a major Union
expedition into the Hanover area, this battle did not occur
in a strategic vacuum.

Rather, it was the only pitched

battle of a strategic duel in which the Union and
Confederate high commands sought to control the region
between Richmond and Fredericksburg.

Union failure in that

duel can be linked to the inability of the Federal high
command to capitalize on the victory at Hanover Courthouse.
Unfortunately for the Union, subsequent events proved that
the victory at Hanover Courthouse was the pinnacle of Union
success on the Peninsula.1
Except for Robert E. Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania, no
Civil War campaign has been as widely debated by historians
as the Peninsular Campaign.

The driving force behind this

historical controversy has been the numerous attempts to
blame either George B. McClellan or Abraham Lincoln for
Union failure on the Peninsula.

T. Harry Williams, James

Studies which have dealt with the Peninsular Campaign
include: Rowena Reed, Combined Operations in the Civil War
(Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska, 1978) ,- James
McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom (New York: Oxford
University, 1988); Douglas Southall Freeman, Lee's
Lieutenants 3 v o l s . (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1942-44); Joseph P. Cullen, The Peninsula Campaign 1862
(Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1973); Studies of the
Peninsular Campaign that have also mentioned Hanover
Courthouse include William K. McDaid, "'Four Years of
Arduous Service' , The History of the Branch-Lane Brigade in
the Civil War" (Ph.D. diss., Michigan State University,
1987) ; James H. Mundy, Second to None. The Story of the 2d
Maine Volunteers (Scarborough, ME: Hary, 1992) ,- Stephen
Sears, To the Gates of Richmond. The Peninsula Campaign (New
York: Ticknor & Fields, 1992),- Alexander S. Webb, The
Peninsula. McClellan's Campaign of 1862 (New York: Jack
Brussel, 1881).
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McPherson, and Stephen Sears have typically been at the
forefront of the school of thought which has criticized
General McClellan.

According to these historians McClellan

was an incompetent, unstable commander whose constant delays
severely undermined Lincoln's push for a short war.
Conversely, Rowena Reed and Ethan S. Rafuse have argued that
George B. McClellan was in fact the North's only link to
military brilliance in the spring and summer of 1862.

These

historians maintain that Lincoln's constant interference in
military affairs served only to disrupt a skillfully planned
and conducted campaign.
Because historians representing the two schools of
thought on the Peninsular Campaign have consistently failed
to consider the importance of the Battle of Hanover
Courthouse, and its critical aftermath, their conclusions
concerning key aspects of the campaign are flawed.

In their

zeal to defend or criticize Lincoln and McClellan historians
have neglected to give sufficient attention to what
transpired between Richmond and Fredericksburg in April and
May of 1862.

Consequently, several misconceptions

concerning the performance of the Union leadership during
that period have been established in Civil War
historiography.

This paper will dispel those misconceptions

by providing a much needed evaluation of the Union high
command as it directed Federal activity before and after
Hanover Courthouse.
Although the Federal high command consisted of generals
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from every theater of the war, this study will focus on. that
portion of the command structure that was responsible for
developing and executing strategy in Virginia.

Thus, in

addition to President Abraham Lincoln and Secretary of War
Edwin M. Stanton, the Union high command as defined in this
paper includes corps commanders and General McClellan.
George Brinton McClellan was only thirty-five years of
age when he led the Army of the Potomac against Richmond in
1862.

A West Point graduate, McClellan's military

background prior to the Civil War included distinguished
service in the Mexican War, and experience as a military
observer in Europe.

In the early days of the Civil War

McClellan's campaign in western Virginia had given the
Northern people virtually their only taste of military
success.

Consequently, when Lincoln needed a general to

command the Federal armies against the upstart Confederacy,
McClellan was the obvious choice.2
McClellan's personal style of leadership remains as
much, if not more, a source of debate among historians as
the Peninsular Campaign itself.

Anything but aggressive,

McClellan emphasized low casualties, progress, and security
in conducting his campaigns.

Like many generals of his

2McClellan's time as Commander-in-Chief was short
lived.
On March 11, Lincoln demoted him to command of the
Department of the Potomac.
Lincoln apparently questioned
McClellan's ability to direct the western theater while
simultaneously commanding the Army of the Potomac. T. Harry
Williams, Lincoln and His Generals (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1952), 24-26, 70-71; Mark M. Boatner, The Civil War
Dictionary (New York: Random House, 1988), 524.
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time, McClellan believed in the Napoleonic concept of
seeking out a climatic, decisive battle in attaining
victory.3

Yet, unlike Napoleon, McClellan was a strict

proponent of defensive warfare.

He therefore hoped to fight

the war-winning engagement from a defensive posture.4

For

those in the North intent upon a quick war, McClellan's
deliberation in attempting to bring about that grand battle
was simply exasperating.
McClellan's arrogant and argumentative nature, along
with a propensity for criticizing others, was his greatest
weakness.

As if those qualities were not harmful enough,

McClellan often convinced himself that the Lincoln
administration intentionally plotted against him and his
army.

Such qualities were instrumental in undermining any

form of effective cooperation with his superiors.
In addition to his shortcomings, McClellan demonstrated
certain strengths which revealed in him a genuine
understanding of military matters.

His ability to train and

organize an army has generally been recognized as unequaled
in the war.

The personal effort he put into the affairs of

3The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan, ed.
Stephen W. Sears (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1989), 169,
215.
4Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, "Lincoln as Military
Strategist," Civil War History. 26, no. 4 (1980): 293; Ethan
S. Rafuse, "McClellan, von Clausewitz, and the Politics of
War, " Columbiad? A Quarterly Review of the War Between the
States l, no. 3 (Fall 1997): 26-27.
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his army was nothing short of impressive.5

Although critics

have habitually cited his tactical and strategic caution as
evidence of poor generalship, the degree of control that
McClellan exercised over his army as a result of that
caution made him a difficult general to defeat in battle.
The Confederates, as well as his adoring men, therefore
viewed McClellan as a capable commander.
The strategic situation in Virginia in the spring of
1862 was considerably more intricate than what it had been
in the summer of 1861.

Although the capture, or defense, of

the Confederate capital at Richmond was still maintained as
a primary war goal by the respective belligerents, there
were new factors which shaped the formation of Union and
Confederate grand strategy.

For instance,

the increase in

the overall size of the opposing armies (over twice their
1861 strength) escalated the scope of military campaigns.
Far from the simple march to Richmond that dominated Federal
strategy the previous summer, the spring campaign of 1862
involved the entire state of Virginia save the extreme
southwest and northwest.

Consequently, the Union and

Confederate command structures were, for the first time,
forced to coordinate the activity of numerous forces
throughout the state toward a focused strategy.
By late March of 1862 the Union Army of the Potomac
was separated into three general groups and deployed

5Williams, 29.
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throughout Virginia and Washington D.C.

(see Fig. 1) .

Positioned in the towns of Warrenton, Manassas, and
Washington was one force of roughly twenty-nine thousand
Union troops commanded by Brigadier General James S .
Wadsworth.

The objective of this command was to protect the

Union capital.

In the lower Shenandoah Valley was another

thirty thousand Federals, under Major General Nathaniel P.
Banks.

Banks' mission was to contain, if not eliminate.

Confederate activity in the Valley.6
The final, and largest Union force of roughly one
hundred and forty thousand men was positioned around
Fortress Monroe on the Virginia Peninsula (thirty-five
thousand of this one hundred and forty thousand had yet to
reach the Peninsula in early April).

Carried by water to

the Peninsula, this army was the primary component of
McClellan's long awaited spring campaign.

Under General

McClellan's direct command, the objective of this army was
the capture of the Confederate capital in Richmond.7
The Confederate forces throughout Virginia were

United States War Department, War of the Rebellion: A
Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and
Confederate Armies, comp. Robert H. Scott (130 Volumes,
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), Series
I, Volume 11, Part 3, Page 53, 60-62 (Henceforth cited as
OR) .
7These figures were calculated by taking McClellan's
reported total strength on March 31 and subtracting Banks',
McDowell's, and Sumner's strengths. However, two of
Sumner's divisions were later returned to the Peninsula,
thereby increasing McClellan's strength by at least eighteen
thousand men. QR, I, 11, pt. 3: 53
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deployed in a defensive posture in which Southern troops
were generally positioned opposite their Union counterparts.
Thus, except for small garrisons deployed to protect various
cities, the two major concentrations of Confederates were in
the Valley and around Richmond.

The former force, about ten

thousand strong, was commanded by Major General Thomas J.
"Stonewall" Jackson; General Joseph E. Johnston commanded
the latter force of approximately sixty thousand men.8
On April 4, 1862, the Union Army of the Potomac left
its encampment around Fortress Monroe and began marching up
the Virginia Peninsula toward Richmond.

McClellan believed

that an advance from the southeast via Fortress Monroe
provided his army with a more secure avenue of attack than
what could be had from northern Virginia.

With Fortress

Monroe behind him, the York River on his right, and the
James River on his left, McClellan's flanks and rear were
indeed protected from assault.

In addition to the security

it provided, McClellan maintained that the Peninsular route
would encounter fewer obstacles, be they natural or man
made.

Although few if any in the Lincoln administration

were convinced by McClellan's logic, most kept their
objections to themselves in hopes that the campaign would
somehow end the war.9
As the final elements of the Army of the Potomac

8Boatner, 633.
9The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan. 166-68,
215-16.
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prepared to load naval transports for the movement from
Washington to Fortress Monroe, Lincoln and his military
advisors became concerned over the safety of the Federal
capital.10

Such concern was justified considering the poor

quality of the regiments McClellan had designated as the
capital's garrison.

In addition to its lack of discipline,

the garrison's overall strength after detachments was
several thousand men less than what McClellan had originally
agreed to provide for the city's defense.11

In response to

this oversight, Lincoln ordered on April 3 that one Union
corps be withheld from McClellan's army in order to
strengthen the defense of the capital.12

McClellan's

subsequent protests against Lincoln's intervention were but
the beginning of a protracted and dedicated effort by the
general to regain control of the detached forces.
The issue of reinforcements was a constant source of
friction between Lincoln and McClellan during the Peninsular
Campaign.

Throughout the month of April, communication

between the two men took on a predictable pattern as it
became increasingly centered around the subject.
McClellan's letters and dispatches typically began with an

I0Congress, Senate, Report of the Joint Committee on the
Conduct of the W a r . 37th Cong., 3rd sess., 1863, Rep. Com.
No. 108 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901),
pt. 1: 261.
“OR. I, 11, pt. 3: 56, 60-62.
12The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Roy P.
Basler, vol. 5 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press,
1953), 179.
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overall summary of his army's progress, but ended with pleas
for more troops.13

Lincoln's correspondence,

the nature of

which became less polite and more formal as the campaign
progressed, usually reminded McClellan of the vast forces
already under the general's command and asked that caution
be replaced with celerity.14

Predictably, such

communication was ineffective in bringing about a
satisfactory agreement concerning McClellan's troop
strength, or his rate of advance.
The beginning of May offered little promise of renewed
cooperation between the President and his general.

The

reinforcement controversy had taken on a momentum of its
own, and become a primary factor in the deterioration of
Lincoln's relations with McClellan.

On May 1, in response

to McClellan's request for more artillery, Lincoln fired off
a telegram to the general which accused him of "indefinite
procrastination."

"Is anything to be done?" Lincoln asked

in obvious frustration.15 McClellan, however, was
unaffected by Lincoln's sense of urgency.

The size of the

forces arrayed against him, combined with Lincoln's
reduction of his own force by forty-five thousand men, was
to McClellan adequate justification for a cautious

13The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan. 231, 233,
241, 249.
l4The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, vol. 5, 182,
184-85, 203.
,sIbid., vol. 5, 203.
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advance.16
Lincoln's reluctance to reinforce McClellan was based
on his belief that the troops necessary for the procedure
could only be obtained by reducing the forces protecting
Washington.

Furthermore, the body of troops that McClellan

fervently requested was the large infantry corps of Major
General Irvin McDowell.17 Forty thousand strong, it had
been McDowell's corps that Lincoln had earlier withheld from
McClellan on April 3.

To Lincoln however, watching that

corps float down the Potomac to the Peninsula was as
obj ectionable in May as it had been in April.18
Irvin McDowell was not among the most popular of Union
generals in 1862.

A robust individual, with a knack for

speaking his mind, he was highly sensitive to how others
perceived him.

Throughout the United States McDowell was

best known as the Union commander who lost the Battle of
Bull Run - the first major engagement of the war.

Because

of that defeat, he had been replaced by McClellan as
commander of the North's eastern army, and demoted to
command of a corps.

In spite of his misfortune, McDowell

was an intelligent and capable officer.19
By mid-May, McDowell, who was taking his orders

l60R. I, 11, pt. 3: 53.
nThe Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan. 232, 234.
l80R, I, 11, pt. 3: 173.
l9Boatner, 531.
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directly from Lincoln, had moved south from Washington and
positioned his corps in and around the town of
Fredericksburg.20

Lincoln placed McDowell's troops in the

Fredericksburg area because he believed that their presence
there shielded Washington from any Confederate thrust from
the south.

In addition, Lincoln maintained that such a

placement kept McDowell's corps in position to move into the
Shenandoah Valley should Federal forces there need
assistance in controlling "Stonewall" Jackson.21

Lincoln

came to realize, however, that McDowell's corps could
reinforce McClellan without jeopardizing its obligations to
other a r eas.
On May 16, after having received a telegram in which
McClellan openly begged for more men, Lincoln finally
decided to reinforce the Army of the Potomac.22

In so

doing, Lincoln initiated within the Peninsular Campaign a
sub-campaign in which the Confederates desperately sought to
prevent the Union from reinforcing McClellan's army near

“Congress, Senate, Report of the Joint Committee on the
Conduct of the W a r , pt 1: 262-63; George B. McClellan,
Report on the Organization and Campaigns of the Army of the
Potomac (New York: Sheldon and Company, 1864; repr., New
York: Libraries Press, 1970), 160.
21The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, vol. 5, 184;
O R . I, 11, pt. 1: 31-32.
“When Lincoln actually decided to reinforce McClellan
is unclear.
On May 15, he sent McClellan a vaguely worded
message in which he would not commit to reinforcing the
general.
Stanton, however, issued the reinforcement orders
on May 17.
Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that Lincoln
made up his mind sometime on May 16. QR, I, 11, p t . 1: 2627, 28; pt. 3: 173.
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Richmond.

The critical, but forgotten, strategic duel that

ensued ranged over the fifty miles between Richmond and
Fredericksburg, and became the centerpiece around which both
sides directed their campaigns in Virginia.
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CHAPTER II
STRATEGIC PREPARATIONS AND MANEUVERING

After laying siege to Confederate defenses at Yorktown
in April, and fighting a sharp battle at Williamsburg on May
5, the Army of the Potomac was slowly but steadily closing
in upon Richmond.

As it did, the Confederate high command

became increasingly concerned over the possibility that
McDowell's corps might advance south from Fredericksburg.
According to Confederate General Robert E. Lee, such a
movement "would not only open an attack upon Richmond, but
might jeopardize the safety of the [Confederate army on] the
Peninsula by threatening its rear."1 At the very least, it
would significantly strengthen the Union forces assaulting
Richmond.

The nature of Confederate strategy in Virginia

therefore began to revolve around Richmond's vulnerability
to attack from the north.

That the Confederates were in any

way prepared to offer an organized defense of the critical
area between Richmond and Fredericksburg was largely
attributable to the efforts of General Lee.
General Lee's role during the Peninsular Campaign was
that of military advisor to Confederate President Jefferson
Davis.

From this ambiguous but influential position Lee

exercised considerable control over Confederate military

l0R. I, 12, pt. 3: 875.
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affairs.2

His exceptional ability to read a strategic

situation, and then formulate an effective plan of action
was vital to the Confederate defense of Richmond.

Unlike

President Davis and General Johnston, who focused their
attention almost exclusively on McClellan's advance from the
southeast, General Lee's strategic perspective included the
entire Virginia theater.
Since early April, when McDowell had first appeared
near Fredericksburg, Lee had recognized the likelihood of a
Federal advance on Richmond from the north.

Lee also

understood that a Federal thrust into the area between
Richmond and Fredericksburg would "interrupt the railroad
communication with Generals Jackson and Ewell" in and around
the Shenandoah Valley.3

Consequently, Lee had funneled

every available regiment he could obtain into the critical
area.4
Lee's effort to establish Confederate strength north of
Richmond produced mixed results.

In a little over one week

Lee managed to gather approximately sixteen thousand
Confederates between Richmond and Fredericksburg (the
majority of these troops were acquired from Confederate
commands in North Carolina).

This force, though, was not

2Freeman, 1: 144-46.
3In mid-May, the six thousand men of Major General
Richard S. Ewell's division were added to Jackson's command.
Jackson's force therefore swelled from ten thousand to
sixteen thousand. QR, I, 11, pt. 3: 510-11.
40R, I, 9: 462, 465-68.
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concentrated into one group.
Roughly twelve thousand of Lee's makeshift force were
positioned just south of Fredericksburg under the command of
Brigadier General Joseph R. Anderson (see Fig. 2) .

The

primary purpose of this division was to contain McDowell's
Federals at Fredericksburg.5

The remaining four thousand,

under Brigadier General Lawrence O'Bryan Branch, were needed
in the vicinity of Hanover Courthouse to guard key
Confederate rail lines.

As a result, neither command was

strong enough to seriously hinder a Union thrust from
Fredericksburg.

A successful Confederate defense of the

area was therefore dependent upon the ability of the two
forces to unite in time to oppose McDowell's anticipated
advance.
On May 20, 1862, McClellan and his Army of the Potomac
advanced to within twelve miles of the Confederate capital
of Richmond.6 Two days earlier, on May 18, McClellan had
received official word from Stanton that McDowell had been
ordered to march south to join him.

Stanton's message

directed McClellan to extend his "right wing to the north of
Richmond[,]" with the objective of uniting with McDowell.

5Anderson's exact strength is not known.
Confederate
correspondence refers to three brigades, as well as
artillery and about 450 cavalrymen, as being under
Anderson's command. Anderson's own brigade contained 4,000
men.
Since the other brigades under him were comprised of
an equal number of regiments it is safe to estimate his
overall strength at twelve thousand. QR, I, 9: 459, 462; I,
12, pt. 3: 873-74; I, 11, p t . 3: 649.
6O R . I, 11, pt. 1: 25.
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Stanton further stated that McClellan was not permitted to
shift McDowell's corps in any way that would leave
Washington uncovered.

Although the reacquisition of

McDowell's corps had at times seemed as important to
McClellan as the capture of Richmond, he was anything but
happy over the news of McDowell's movement.7
The primary cause of McClellan's displeasure was
Lincoln's insistence that the reinforcements march overland
to join the Army of the Potomac.

"I fear there is little

hope that [McDowell] can join me overland in time for the
coming battle[,]" stated McClellan on May 21 in response to
Lincoln's directions.8 The general continued by reminding
Lincoln that any delays would be dangerous, a statement the
President must have found strange coming from McClellan.
McClellan assured Lincoln that sending McDowell by water
would be a faster alternative than marching from
Fredericksburg.

Behind McClellan's apparent sense of

urgency, however, was a desire to have complete control over
any reinforcements sent to his army.

Ignoring Lincoln's

expressed orders that Washington was not to be uncovered,
McClellan convinced himself that if McDowell's corps came by
water he would somehow have more control over its
involvement in the great battle for Richmond.

He therefore

used the supposed quickness of the water route to entice

7Ibid., 27-28.
8McClellan, Report on the Organization and Campaigns of
the Armv of the Potomac. 197.
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Lincoln to change his mind on the issue.9
McClellan's efforts to have McDowell's corps sent by
water had no effect on Lincoln.

The President's commitment

to the overland route stemmed from his realization that it
allowed him to reinforce McClellan without removing McDowell
from supporting distance of the Federals in the Valley.10
Another benefit of the march, contrary to McClellan's
claims, was that it would allow McDowell to reach the Army
of the Potomac in less time.

"By land [McDowell]

can reach

you in five days," Lincoln assured McClellan in a telegram
on May 21,

"whereas by water he would not reach you in two

weeks, judging by past experience."11 Of course, Lincoln's
favorite aspect of the overland route was that it
effectively screened Washington from a Confederate thrust
from Richmond.

On May 21, in obedience to Lincoln's

instruction, McClellan began shifting his army to the north
of Richmond (see Fig. 3).
In an effort to ensure McDowell's understanding of his
role and objective in the reinforcement process, Lincoln and
Stanton went to Fredericksburg to visit the general on May
23.

They found that McDowell's troops were generally ready

for the march south (Brigadier General James Shield's

9The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan. 265.
10OR. I, 11, pt. 1: 27, 32.
“The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, vol. 5, 226.
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division was not completely ready as it had only recently
arrived from detached service in the Valley).12 More
importantly, the President and Secretary of War were
apparently satisfied with McDowell's comprehension of his
instructions, which simply directed him to link up with
McClellan without in any way uncovering the capital.13
For General McDowell, the task of uniting his corps
with the Army of the Potomac involved several key
challenges.

For example, General Anderson, with twelve

thousand Confederates, was intent on disrupting any Federal
attempt to advance south from Fredericksburg.

If Anderson

could not defeat McDowell he could at least destroy key
bridges spanning the numerous rivers between Richmond and
Fredericksburg.

McDowell would then be forced to either

search out suitable fords, or rebuild the bridges; either
option required time.

Yet, before McDowell could even set

out he had to prepare forty thousand men for a march through
enemy territory to an unspecified destination.

This was a

challenge in itself.
In spite of such obstacles, McDowell demonstrated
considerable skill and foresight in planning his march to
McClellan (see Fig. 4).

Confident of his ability to

maneuver Anderson out of his position south of
Fredericksburg, McDowell gave little consideration to the

12Congress, Senate, Report of the Joint Committee on the
Conduct of the W a r , pt. 1: 263.
t30R. I, 11, pt. 1: 28.
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possibility of a serious Confederate delaying action.14
McDowell's preparation of a pontoon bridge to be carried
along with his command virtually eliminated the potential
for lengthy delays in crossing rivers.

After accurately

deducing that the linkup with McClellan was likely to occur
in the area of Hanover Courthouse, McDowell decided that he
would draw his supplies via the York River as opposed to an
overland supply line from Fredericksburg.

He therefore

decided to conduct his march without the burden of a supply
line.

Since this meant that his force would live off of

what it carried until it gained access to the York, McDowell
ordered that plenty of provisions be carried along.15
Finally, McDowell sent a telegram to McClellan which
attempted to initiate communication between the two
generals.

Although McClellan had earlier complained over

the absence of such communication, he did not respond.16
As a result of his excellent preparations, McDowell was
able to inform the president, during the May 23 visit, that
his entire command could begin its movement on Sunday, May
25.

A pleasantly surprised Lincoln told McDowell that it

was not necessary for the corps to move out on the Sabbath.
Lincoln instead suggested they use that Sunday to make

14Congress, Senate, Report of the Joint Committee on the
Conduct of the W a r , pt. 1: 268.
15Ibid., 268.
160R. I, 11, pt. 3: 186, pt. 1: 27; The Civil War Papers
of George B. McClellan. 270-71.
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absolutely sure that the march got underway on Monday, the
26 th.17
Lincoln and Stanton returned to Washington the night of
May 23.

Early on the 24th Lincoln telegraphed McClellan to

inform him of McDowell's impending movement.

Lincoln also

suggested, probably at the request of McDowell, that
McClellan send a force to "cut off

[Anderson's]

from Richmond," preserve key railroad bridges,
intercept the enemy's retreat[.]"18
good sense.

supplies
"and

The suggestion made

McClellan, pleased with the prospect of finally

regaining McDowell's services, was quite willing to comply.
On May 24, McClellan directed a division of infantry to move
in the direction of Hanover Courthouse, a point from which
such measures could be carried o u t .19
Generals Lee and Anderson had, for two weeks, feared
that McClellan might launch just such an expedition.

In a

telegram dated May 10, Lee advised Anderson to use "extreme
watchfulness and caution . . .

to guard against any attempt

to cut off your command [from Richmond]

. . . while engaging

nEarlier in the war McDowell had begun a march on a
Sunday and "had been very much condemned for it all over the
country." He was undoubtedly relieved when Lincoln told him
to postpone his departure until Monday.
Congress, Senate,
Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the W a r , p t .
1, 263.
I8Lincoln to McClellan, 24 May, 1862, telegram no. 6,
from the George B. McClellan Papers, Reel 23, Shelf no. DM
16,004, Library of Congress, Washington D.C.
l9OR. I, 11, pt. 1: 30; Porter to McClellan, 3:50 a.m.,
24 May, 1862, George B. McClellan Papers, Reel 23, Shelf No.
DM 16,004, Library of Congress.
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you in front [. ] 1,30 Anderson's ominous reports on the size
and activity of the Federal force in Fredericksburg only
added to Lee's concern for Anderson's perilous position.21
On May 16, in an effort to counter the Union threat to
Anderson and the Hanover area, Lee ordered General Jackson
to attack the Federals in the Shenandoah Valley.

Lee hoped

that Jackson's attack would deny McDowell any additional
reinforcements, and perhaps even draw Federals away from
Fredericksburg.

Lee did not specify a date for Jackson's

attack, he simply indicated that he wanted it done
"speedily.1,22
By pure chance Jackson's offensive erupted on May 23,
the very day that Lincoln visited McDowell at
Fredericksburg.23

The first reports of Jackson's assault

reached Lincoln on May 24 via telegraph, but the news had
little effect on the President.

In the same May 24 telegram

that informed McClellan of McDowell's impending movement,
Lincoln calmly mentioned that the Confederates had defeated
a small Union force at Front Royal.

However, when it became

apparent that Jackson intended to carry his offensive in the

“QR, I, 12, pt. 3: 885-86.
21Ibid. , 873, 885-86.
“ Ibid., 892-93.
“Jackson began his campaign by defeating a force of one
thousand Federals at Front Royal, Virginia.
He then
advanced rapidly on Winchester, nearly trapping Banks'
Federal army in the process. On May 25 Jackson defeated
Banks at Winchester, and continued his advance northward.
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direction of Harpers Perry, Lincoln reacted swiftly.24

Only

hours after the President's initial May 24 telegram to
McClellan, Lincoln sent another that announced the
suspension of McDowell's movement.

In the telegxam an

anxious Lincoln explained that he wanted "to throw Gen.
Fremont's force and part of Gen. McDowell's in [Jackson's]
rear.1,25
McClellan's reaction to the postponement of McDowell's
movement was odd considering his usual penchant for
protests.

McClellan's response read:

"Telegram of [4:00] PM

received.

I will make my calculations accordingly."26

Why

the general accepted the news so placidly is uncertain.
Perhaps McClellan hoped that the diversion of half of the
Fredericksburg troops into the Valley would finally convince
Lincoln to send him the remainder by water, a contingency
that McClellan continued to anticipate.

A more likely

explanation is that McClellan did not consider the
postponement of McDowell's march as a major change in plans.
Realizing that the operation "was simply suspended, not

^QR. I, 12, pt. 3: 219; Lincoln to McClellan, 24 May,
1862, telegraph no. 6 and 7, from the George B. McClellan
Papers, Reel 23, Shelf no. DM 16,004, Library of Congress,
Washington D.C.
“General John C. Freemont's fifteen thousand Union
troops were brought into the Shenandoah Valley from duty in
extreme western Virginia. Lincoln's plan was to bring
Freemont, Banks, and McDowell against Jackson. Ibid.
“After receiving Lincoln's telegram postponing the
reinforcement operation, McClellan cancelled his orders of
that morning directing a division toward Hanover Courthouse.
O R . I, 11, pt. 3: 190.
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revoked, " McClellan understood that he "was not at liberty
to abandon the northern approach [on Richmond] .,,z7
McClellan could only wait for the rescheduling of the
postponed reinforcement operation. McDowell, however,
inherited an entirely new, and unexpected challenge.
McDowell's new orders directed him to lay "aside for the
present the movement on Richmond [in order] to put twenty
thousand men in motion at once for the Shenandoah [.] "28 The
goal of McDowell's new mission, as described by Lincoln, was
the capture of Jackson's command.

To ensure that McDowell

executed his orders promptly, and to report on any
unnecessary delays, Lincoln sent Secretary of the Treasury
Salmon P. Chase to Fredericksburg on May 25.”
Unlike McClellan, McDowell was very outspoken in his
objections to Lincoln's decision to postpone the march to
Richmond.

"This is a crushing blow to us[,]" McDowell said

in a telegram to Stanton.30 McDowell was also displeased
that he was expected to play a major role in Lincoln's plan
to trap Jackson.

"Everything now depends upon the celerity

and vigor of your movement [, ] " said Lincoln in a telegram to
McDowell.

An agitated McDowell quickly replied that he was

"entirely beyond helping distance of General Banks; no

^OR.

I, ll, pt. 1: 31.

28The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, vol. 5, 23233.
29OR.

I, 12, pt. 3: 220.

“ Ibid., 220.
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celerity or vigor will avail so far as [Banks] is
concerned."

Intent upon making his point, McDowell

continued by warning the President that moving his corps
from Fredericksburg to the Valley would "gain nothing for
you there, and shall lose much for you here."31
McClellan and McDowell each understood that the purpose
of Jackson's Valley offensive was to prevent a linkup
between the Army of the Potomac and the Federals at
Fredericksburg.32

Whether or not Lincoln could see this, or

was simply obsessed with eliminating Jackson's constant
threat to Washington, is a source of much debate among
historians.

What has been overshadowed by this debate is

that Lincoln's counter-order sent only half of McDowell's
corps into the Valley.

The divisions of Brigadier Generals

George McCall and Rufus King, together totaling twenty
thousand Union troops, remained at Fredericksburg.
While in the process of sending half of his corps north
to suppress Jackson, McDowell began to act rather curiously.
On May 25, he accurately reported that Anderson's
Confederates had fallen back from their position south of
Fredericksburg toward Hanover Junction.

On the same day,

McDowell informed Stanton that he was sending the divisions
of McCall and King to make a "strong demonstration" to the
south of Fredericksburg.

The object of this demonstration,

31Ibid., 220.
32The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan. 276; QR,
I, 12, pt. 3: 220-1.
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explained McDowell, was "to mislead the enemy as to our
movements and intentions" to trap Jackson.33
Why McDowell felt compelled to make this demonstration
is a mystery.

No one in the Union high command had

suggested such a thing.

Since McDowell had only that day

reported that the Confederates had retreated to the Hanover
area, it is unclear what enemy he intended to "mislead."
That he used twenty thousand men in his demonstration is
also peculiar in that half, or even a quarter, of that
number would have sufficed.

McDowell, though, was trying to

discourage Lincoln and Stanton from sending any more of his
troops from Fredericksburg to the Valley.

If McCall and

King were busy demonstrating south of Fredericksburg it
would be unwise, and inconvenient, to sent them into the
Valley after Jackson.
Even after Lincoln cancelled the march to join
McClellan, McDowell still hoped that he would be allowed to
take his remaining twenty thousand men and go on to
Richmond. McDowell tried to convince Lincoln and Stanton
that his presence was very much needed at Fredericksburg,
and that a subordinate would be just as capable of catching
Jackson as himself.34

Lincoln was not convinced.

On May

26, after two days of indecision, Lincoln expressed his
belief that McDowell could better direct the movements of

33Ibid., 232.
^Congress, Senate, Report of the Joint Committee on the
Conduct of the War, pt. 1: 263-64.
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his divisions from somewhere closer to the Valley.

McDowell

consented, but strongly recommended that McCall and King be
allowed to remain below Fredericksburg.35
To accommodate Lincoln's wishes, McDowell transferred
his headquarters to Manassas
north of Fredericksburg) .

(roughly thirty three miles

In his absence, direct command of

the two divisions below Fredericksburg fell to George
McCall.

Sixty years of age in 1862, McCall was a West Point

graduate and veteran of the Seminole and Mexican w a r s .
Having received no orders to continue the demonstration,
McCall established camp roughly eight miles south of the
town.

From there he sent out the cavalry brigade of

Brigadier General George Bayard to reconnoiter the area
between Hanover and Fredericksburg.

Bayard's main objective

was to collect any information concerning the strength and
destination of Anderson's retreating Confederates.36
Anderson's withdrawal from before Fredericksburg began
late on the night of May 24, and continued without Federal
interference until evening of May 25.

Anderson halted his

march south near the intersection of the Virginia Central
and Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac railroads.
intersection, known as Hanover Junction,

That

is located roughly

eight miles northeast of Hanover Courthouse.

Once there,

Anderson notified General Branch, whose brigade was in the

35I b i d ., 263-64; QR, I, 12, p t . 3: 221, 229-30, 243.
36I b i d ., 253, 284-85.
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proximity of the courthouse,
commands.

that he wanted to unify the two

The following day, however, Anderson sent word

that he was moving his command further south via the
Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad, and that the
two forces should unite closer to Richmond.37 For whatever
reason, Branch failed to receive this communication.
Although Anderson's retreat came as a surprise to the
Federals, it had been anticipated by Confederate commanders
for several days.

The actual reason for the withdrawal had

little to do with the Federal buildup at Fredericksburg.
Rather, it was McClellan's shift to the north of Richmond,
which threatened to cut Anderson off from the Confederate
capital, that caused General Johnston to give the recall
order.38
As Johnston's fear of a linkup between McDowell and
McClellan increased, he began to display more interest in
the affairs of the Confederate forces north of Richmond.
After ordering Anderson away from Fredericksburg, Johnston
indicated to Branch and Anderson that he expected their
commands to unite at some point.39

In expressing that

expectation, Johnston gave his subordinates conflicting
ideas of exactly where that unification of force was to
occur.

As a result, Anderson and his men rode the rails

^OR. I, 11, pt. 3: 544, 550-51.
38Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations
(New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1874), 130.
39OR, I, 11, pt. 3: 537, 543, 544; Johnston, 130.
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toward Richmond, while Branch waited for Anderson to appear
somewhere near Hanover Courthouse.

The closer Anderson's

division got to Richmond the more exposed became Branch's
position at Hanover Courthouse.
On May 26, while preparing for his grand assault upon
Richmond, General McClellan's attention was also drawn to
the area between Richmond and Fredericksburg.

One factor

that aroused McClellan's concern for the area was a telegram
from McDowell to Stanton.

The telegram, which Stanton

forwarded to McClellan, stated that the Confederates "had
fallen back from Fredericksburg toward Richmond, and that
General McDowell's advance was 8 miles south of the
Rappahannock. ,|40
all.

In reality, McDowell was not advancing at

The troops south of Fredericksburg were merely

carrying out McDowell's unnecessary demonstrations, but to
McClellan it appeared that his reinforcements were finally
on their way to join him.

Then, on the same day, he

received reports of a sizeable force of Confederates near
Hanover Courthouse.41
McClellan's intelligence regarding the Confederates at
Hanover Courthouse was obtained from Union reconnaissance
patrols conducted from May 24-26.

The general's scouts

accurately estimated the number of Confederates in the

““George B. McClellan, McClellan's Own Story (New York:
Charles L. Webster & Company, 1887), 369.
41Ibid., 368-69.
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Hanover area at between three to five thousand men.42
McClellan viewed this enemy force as a serious obstacle to
the anticipated juncture with McDowell.

In addition, he saw

the Confederates at Hanover Courthouse as a threat to the
communications of the Army of the Potomac.43

Unwilling to

assault Richmond with a large enemy force beyond his flank,
McClellan contemplated sending an expedition to eliminate
the Confederate force.
Word of McDowell's advance, and the news of the
Confederate presence at Hanover Courthouse may have been
enough to convince McClellan to initiate operations in the
Hanover area.

If not, a telegram from Lincoln received

during the late evening of May 26 was the deciding factor.
Lincoln's message requested that the Richmond,
Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad be cut in order to stop
the flow of supplies from Richmond to Anderson and Jackson.
McClellan realized that the most logical place to disrupt
that rail line was at Hanover Junction.

McClellan,

therefore, interpreted the President's request as yet
another reason to dispatch an expedition to the Hanover

42OR, I, 11, pt. 1: 33, 666-68, 673-76.
43McClellan was worried that a Confederate force at
Hanover Courthouse could advance down the opposite side of
the Pamunkey River, and then use the river crossings as an
avenue into the Union rear. McClellan did not actually
specify this fear, but his efforts to destroy those river
crossings revealed his concern. McClellan, McClellan's Own
Story. 368.
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Shortly after receiving Lincoln's May 26 telegram,
McClellan ordered a division of roughly twelve thousand
Union soldiers under the command of Brigadier General FitzJohn Porter to Hanover Courthouse.45

Porter's main

objective, as described by McClellan, was to clear the area
beyond the army's right flank as far as the courthouse, and
beyond if possible.

Along the way he was to destroy any

bridges, railroad or otherwise, which could assist the enemy
in gaining McClellan's flank and rear.

Once at Hanover

Courthouse, Porter was expected to cut Confederate lines of
communication and supply which connected Richmond with
Confederate forces in northern Virginia.

Finally, Porter's

expedition was to serve as a means by which McDowell's
twenty thousand troops, advancing from Fredericksburg,

could

be united with the Army of the Potomac.46
McClellan's selection of Fitz-John Porter as the
commander of the Hanover expedition was sound.

A

professional soldier before the Civil War, Porter had fought

44Ibid., 368-69.
45Morell's division contained 530 officers and 11,192
enlisted men for a total of 11,722.
5th Corps returns for
May 1862, Fitz-John Porter Papers, Container 3, Library of
Congress, Washington D.C.
^OR. I, 11, pt. l: 680-81; Fitz-John Porter, "Hanover
Court House and Gaines's Mill," in Battles and Leaders, ed.
Robert Johnson and Clarence Buel (New York: Century, 188788) 2: 319.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

36
with distinction in the conflict with Mexico.

After serving

as an instructor of cavalry and artillery tactics at West
Point, Porter had participated in frontier assignments, and
the Utah Expedition.

Prior to May, 1862, Porter's

experience in the Civil War had been fairly undramatic.
When ordered by McClellan to undertake the Hanover
expedition, Porter, a brigadier general, was in command of
an entire Union corps.

The Hanover Courthouse expedition

was, therefore, Porter's first real opportunity to
demonstrate his skill as a battlefield commander.47
The force under Porter's command for the expedition
consisted of one infantry division,

led by Brigadier General

George W. Morell, and an unattached infantry brigade under
Colonel G o u v e m e u r K. Warren.
of three separate brigades.

Morell's division was made up
The First and Second Brigades

were commanded by Brigadier General John H. Martindale and
Colonel James McQuade respectively.

The Third Brigade was

led by Brigadier General Daniel Butterfield.

Warren's

brigade was provisional in nature, and included a battery of
artillery and a regiment of cavalry in addition to its three
infantry units.

Finally, Porter's command included a small

brigade of cavalry, with a battery of light artillery
attached, and Colonel Hiram Berdan's regiment of green-clad
sharpshooters .48

47Boatner, 661.
48QR, I, 11, pt. 1: 33-34, 681-82, 698-700.
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Porter's plan for carrying out McClellan's instructions
was rather simple, and reflected Porter's willingness, if
not desire, to engage in battle.

Under

Morell's division was to march at first

Porter's plan,
light on May 27 from

New Bridge to Hanover Courthouse (see Fig. 5) .

New Bridge,

which spanned the Chickahominy River six miles northeast of
Richmond, was located approximately thirteen miles southsoutheast of Hanover Courthouse.

Fortunately for Porter's

troops the roads from New Bridge to the

courthouse were

fairly direct, limiting the distance of

the actual march to

about fifteen miles.49
Prior to May 27, Colonel Warren's brigade was busy
wrecking bridges and railroads spanning the lower Pamunkey.
These structures were viewed by the Union high command as
potential avenues for Confederate raids into the Union
rear.

Warren's role in Porter's expedition was to be two

fold.

First, he was given the task of destroying the

bridges along the upper Pamunkey.

While executing that

assignment, Warren was also expected to operate in concert
with Morell's movement by marching his command parallel to
the Pamunkey toward Hanover Courthouse.

This line of march

would bring Warren to Hanover Courthouse from the east, and
thereby place his brigade on the flank of any Confederates

49Ibid., 681-82; Calvin
Military Atlas of the Civil
Printing Office, 1891-1895;
1983) , Map XVI, Map C no. 1
reprint addition).

D. Cowles, comp., The Official
War (Washington: Government
reprint, New York: Gramercy,
and 2 (Map references are to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

38

J

Scale o f Miles

Porter’s Advance

Hanover
^Courthouse
Ashland
Slash
Church

■»'

Cash
Comer
Peake's
Station

Old

PORTER

New Bridge

New Bridg ,®^*-**1

Richmond

Fig. 5

Porter's March to Hanover Courthouse, May 27.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

39
opposing Morell's advance from the south.50
The Confederate force which was the target in all of
Porter's planning was Branch's brigade of North Carolina
infantry.

On May 26, Branch's command was bivouacked two

and a half miles to the south of Hanover Courthouse, at
Slash Church.

Branch's orders from General Joseph E.

Johnston directed him to serve as a link between Johnston's
army at Richmond and Anderson's force just south of
Fredericksburg.

In addition, Branch was responsible for the

protection of both the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac
Railroad and the Virginia Central Railroad between Richmond
and Fredericksburg.51
To accomplish the difficult task before him, Branch had
the 7th, 18th, 28th, 33d, and 37th North Carolina (NC)
infantry regiments of his own brigade, the 12th North
Carolina (unattached) , and the 45th Georgia (unattached) .
For artillery Branch had the battery of A.C. Latham.
Altogether Branch's brigade contained approximately 4,500
men.

Although Branch had no cavalry under his direct

command, General Anderson did send a regiment of Virginia
cavalry to the Hanover area with orders to cooperate with
Branch.

In addition. Brigadier General J. E. B. Stuart sent

his 4th Virginia Cavalry to operate to the immediate west of

"OR, I, 11, pt. 1: 680-82; The Official Military Atlas
of the Civil War. Map XVII no. 1, C no. 1 and 2.
51James H. Lane, "History of Lane's North Carolina
Brigade," Southern Historical Society Papers. 7 (1879): 103;
OR, I, 11, pt. 1: 741.
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the courthouse.52
Although Branch's brigade eventually proved itself to
be one of the toughest in the South's eastern army, in late
May of 1862 the men were a fairly disgruntled collection of
soldiers.

Their misfortune had begun in March, when the

brigade suffered a stinging defeat at New Bern, North
Carolina.

Then, in April, came the passage of the First

Conscription Act by the Confederate Congress.

This piece of

legislation bound all white males between the ages of
eighteen and thirty-five to three years of service in the
Confederate military.

For those individuals who had already

served a year in the army, which was most of Branch's
brigade, another two years of service was required.

Not

surprisingly this did little to endear the Confederate
government to this group of North Carolinians.53
Yet another blow to the brigade's morale occurred in
early May when Branch was ordered to transfer his command to
Virginia to participate in operations in that state.

Many

of Branch's troops believed that their obligation as
soldiers was limited to the defense of North Carolina.

The

prospect of serving, and perhaps dying, for Virginia was

52OR, I, 9: 460, 11, pt. 1: 741, p t . 3: 537, 540-41;
Lane, "History of Lane's North Carolina Brigade," 103;
Robert Krick, 9th Virginia Cavalry (Lynchburg, VA: H. E.
Howard, 1982), 6; Kenneth L. Styles, 4th Virginia Cavalry
(Lynchburg, VA: H. E. Howard, 1985), 11-12.
53Boatner, 172.
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therefore objectionable to them.54
Morale was not the only problem which faced General
Branch on the eve of Porter's advance.

The practice of

allowing units to elect their officers had left many of the
brigade's regiments and companies with leaders of
questionable ability.

Another problem which was hardly

unique to Branch's troops was the poor quality of weapons in
the brigade.

While one company of the 37th NC was equipped

with high quality Enfield rifles, the soldiers of the 28th
NC, one of Branch's largest regiments, carried old smooth
bore muskets which were "badly altered from flint to
percussion."

Not only were these muskets short-range

weapons, and thus greatly inferior to the newer rifled
muskets, but they could also be difficult to supply with
ammunition.55
An additional concern for Branch was the condition of
his artillery.

When Latham's battery reported for duty with

the brigade, on or about May 16, it was described as having
only half the men necessary to operate the guns effectively.

^ c D a i d , "'Four Years of Arduous Service': The History
of the Branch-Lane Brigade in the Civil War," 49-50, 56-57.
55William Grover Morris to his wife, May 30 1862, Folder
1, in the William Groves Morris Papers #3626-2, Southern
Historical Collection, Wilson Library, The University of
North Carolina, Chapel Hill; James H. Lane, "Twenty-Eighth
North Carolina Infantry," Southern Historical Society
Papers. 24, (1896), 327.
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Worse yet, the battery's horses were completely untrained.36
Unlike Fitz John Porter, Lawrence 0'Bryan Branch had no
military experience prior to the outbreak of the American
Civil War.

Branch's background was in politics, and, like

many political generals of the Civil War, he had learned
from experience that political prestige did not guarantee
military success.

Branch's defeat at New Bern was not

entirely his fault, but he had made tactical errors which
contributed to the eventual collapse of his line.
after the battle,

Shortly

some members of the North Carolina press

began to call into question Branch's ability as a commander.
Branch was highly sensitive to these criticisms, and it is
doubtful that one month, and a transfer to Virginia, had
removed them from his memory.37
Prior to May 26, the strategic duel north of Richmond
between the Union and Confederate high commands was a Union
failure.

Lincoln and his generals did manage to organize a

feasible reinforcement operation which promised to bring
extreme pressure on the Confederates at Richmond.

Superior

Confederate strategy, however, was successful in causing a
last-minute miscarriage of that plan.

Taken completely by

surprise by Thomas Jackson's offensive in the Shenandoah
Valley, the Union high command disagreed on the proper
response.

They had transferred troops from the Valley to

36Lawrence O'Bryan Branch Letter Book, in Branch Family
Papers, Duke University, Durham.
^Boatner, 80; McDaid, 41-43.
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Fredericksburg, and altered the direction of McClellan's
attack on the Confederate capital, all to reinforce
McClellan north of Richmond.

In spite of such heavy

commitments, Lincoln postponed McDowell's march to
McClellan, and thereby validated Confederate strategy.
While Confederate strategy during early and middle May
was successful in preventing a juncture between McClellan
and McDowell, it did not negate the possibility that the two
generals would unite at a later date.

Understanding this,

General Johnston took a more active role in Confederate
affairs between Richmond and Fredericksburg.

Lee's

influence on events in the area was thereby reduced since
his advisory role obliged him to defer to Johnston's
decisions.58

Johnston's directives, however, caused only

confusion among Confederate commanders in the region, and
left Branch's brigade in a dangerously exposed position.
More importantly, by recalling Anderson from Fredericksburg
Johnston unwittingly offered the twenty thousand Federals at
Fredericksburg a clear line of march to Hanover Courthouse.

58Freeman, 1: 204-5.
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CHAPTER III
THE BATTLE OF HANOVER COURTHOUSE

At around 4 A.M., May 27, Porter's Federals began their
march to Hanover Courthouse during a driving thunder storm.
Porter's main column was arranged with Martindale's brigade
in the lead.

McQuade's brigade followed behind Martindale's

troops, and Butterfield's brigade brought up the rear.

The

entire column was preceded by an advance guard of cavalry
and light artillery led by Brigadier General William H.
Emory.1
The first half of the day was truly an ordeal for the
average soldier in Porter's command.

Between the rain, and

a 3:30 A.M. reveille, Porter's men had scarcely a chance to
close their eyes before being called into ranks.

Private

Oliver Wilcox Norton, a bugler in the 83d Pennsylvania
infantry, wrote in a letter home that they were rushed into
line so quickly that there was "no time to make coffee," or
a decent breakfast.

Norton and his comrades therefore made

due with crackers and canteen water.2
The rain, which the soldiers emphasized as particularly
heavy, reduced the roads to cauldrons of mud.

"The roads

were horrible," Norton wrote "and the artillery was

‘O R . I, 11, pt. 1: 682, 698.
201iver Wilcox Norton, Army Letters 1861-1865
Privately printed, 1903), 82.
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constantly getting stuck and causing delay."3

As if the men

were not wet enough, the destruction of local bridges made
it necessary for the troops to wade several rain-swollen
streams.

Porter, perhaps guilty of understatement,

described the march to Hanover
Although the rain finally

later

Courthouse as "laborious."4
ended between 10:00

noon, the soldiers' sufferings continued.

A.M. and

According to

Bugene Nash, the adjutant of the 44th New York, the "rain
ceased and the sun came out blistering hot."

The intense

heat, said Nash, caused many individuals to leave the ranks.
Private Norton described the heat as so bad that "officers
and men gave out and lay by the roadside together, utterly
unable to go any farther without rest."

The misery of the

heat was made all the worse by the heaviness of the men's
wet wool uniforms.

Most of those uniforms were undoubtedly

still quite damp at the end of the day.5
In spite of the adversity, Porter's command managed to
struggle its way to Cash Corner by noon.

Cash Corner was an

intersection of Old Church Road, which led to Hanover
Courthouse, and Ash Cake Road, which ran in from Slash

N o r t o n later played an interesting role in the
creation of the famous evening tatoo referred to as Tap s .
General Butterfield, Norton's brigade commander, actually
composed the legendary tune in July of 1862.
In doing so,
Butterfield relied upon Norton to transfer the General's
whistling into a bugle call.
Ibid., 82, 327-28.
“OR, I, 11, pt. 1: 684.
sEugene A. Nash, History of the Forty-Fourth New York
Volunteer Infantry (Dayton: Momingside, 1988) , 74; Norton,
82.
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Church (see Fig. 6) .

This intersection was two miles south

of the courthouse and three miles east of Slash Church.
Half way between Slash Church and Cash C o m e r the Virginia
Central Railroad crossed Ash Cake Road.

This was the area,

two miles from its actual namesake, where the Battle of
Hanover Courthouse was fought.6
Branch/s decision to place his brigade at Slash Church
was not based on the natural strength of the position, but
rather on the maneuverability he would be afforded by the
Ash Cake Road.

Not only did this location provide Branch

with a prime site for protecting the Virginia Central and
Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac railroads,

it also

allowed him an avenue of retreat if attacked by a larger
force.7
On the morning of May 27, Branch detached two of his
regiments on special assignments.

The 45th Georgia was sent

six miles to the west to repair the Richmond,
Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad, which Federal cavalry
raiders had damaged on May 26.

Meanwhile, the 28th NC

regiment, under James H. Lane, was sent five miles east to
Taliaferro's Mill to deal with a small party of Union
cavalry along the Pamunkey.

However, almost as soon as the

28th reached its destination, Lane received a report that a
Federal column was advancing on Hanover Courthouse from the

60 R . I, 11, pt. 1: 693, 701, 707; Cowles, c o m p ., Map
LXXXI no. 3.
7O R . I, 11, pt. 1: 741.
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south.

Lane quickly ordered his troops to counter-march

back toward Slash Church.8
When Porter's advanced guard reached Cash C o m e r ,

it

cut off the 28th NC from the rest of Branch's brigade.
Lane's only option was to attempt to retake Cash Corner and
thereby regain access to Ash Cake Road.

Although Lane had

almost nine hundred men in his regiment, he was no match for
Porter's three brigades.
The initial fighting of the day occurred around 12:30
P.M. when the 28th NC, advancing down the road from Hanover
Courthouse, ran into the 25th New York (NY) , which was
moving up the same road toward the courthouse.

The 25th NY

was positioned with one half of the regiment in some woods
on the right side of the road, and the other half in the
yard of a local resident named Dr. Kinney (Kinney's house
was about a mile north of Cash Comer) .9
After some brief skirmishing, Lane's North Carolinians
made a direct attack on the left wing of the 25th NY.

When

Lane ordered his men to drive the New Yorkers from Dr.
Kinney's yard, and an adjacent wheatfield, the Confederates
responded with enthusiasm.

With much shouting, some of the

Southerners "leaped the ditch and high fence enclosing the
field of wheat, while the rest rushed into the yard and

8Ibid., 741, 743; Lane,
Infantry," 328.

"Twenty-Eighth North Carolina

9O R . I, 11, pt. 1: 714-15; Cowles, comp., Map XXI no.
11 .
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around the house."

The Federals fell back from the house to

the outbuildings and b a m ,

using each structure as a

rallying point.10
Casualties in the 25th NY mounted rapidly.

In only a

few minutes the regiment lost three lieutenants, a captain,
and numerous enlisted men.

The lieutenant colonel

commanding the left wing was also hit.

Overwhelmed by

Lane's assault. Colonel Charles H. Johnson ordered his New
Yorkers to retreat.

Upon hearing the order, both wings of

the regiment bolted for the rear.

In the confusion that

followed seventy of Johnson's men were captured by the
Confederates.11
Lane handed over the Union prisoners to some troopers
from the 4th Virginia Cavalry and set out to supervise the
pursuit of the retiring Federals.

At this point in the

battle it was around one o'clock in the afternoon.

After

chasing the 25th NY through yet another field of wheat, Lane
and his regiment found themselves confronted by
Butterfield's Federal brigade and two sections of artillery
(see Fig. 7) .,2
The Union artillery was the first to open fire on the
advancing Confederates.

Although the opening salvo passed

harmlessly over the heads of the Southerners, the confusion

l0QR, I, 11, pt. 1: 743-44.
"Ibid., 714-16, 743-44.
"Ibid., 722-23, 743.
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it caused in the Confederate ranks was enough to bring
Lane's attack to a halt.

Lame promptly brought up his

single section of artillery and a noisy duel ensued between
the opposing caumoneers.13
The artillery exchauige near Cash C o m e r could be heard
by General Brauich at Slash Church.

The number of pieces

being discharged was aui indicator to Brauich that Lane was
opposed by more than a small raiding party.

Then, while

listening to the distant battle, Brauich amd his men suddenly
found themselves the target of Union guns.14
The Federals who were firing on Branch belonged to a
strong reconnaissance force under General Martindale.

As

soon as it had arrived at Cash Corner, Porter had sent this
force, which included a section of artillery auid two
infantry regiments, to support a cavalry screen at Peadce's
Station.

Once at the station, Martindale received word from

his skirmishers that a large body of Confederates were
camped beyond the railroad.

The general promptly ordered

his two 3-inch rifled guns, with a maucimum range of over two
miles, to open fire on Brauich's troops a mile and a half
away.

While the artillery crews worked hard, Martindale's

infantry set about tearing up the Virginia Central Railroad,

I3Allen Paul Speer, ed., Voices from Cemetery Hill. The
Civil War Diary. Reports, and Letters of Colonel William
Henry Asbury Speer (1861-1864) (Johnson City, TN:
Overmountain Press, 1997), 52; QR, I, 11, pt. 1; 744.
14Ibid., 741.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

52
and nearby telegraph wire.15
Branch, having been taken by surprise, responded by
bringing up two guns of his own.

In addition, he gave

orders to the 18th NC and 37th NC to reinforce Lane.

As the

18 th and 37th advanced up the Ash Cake Road toward Cash
Comer, Martindale began pulling his units back to the
intersection.

By 2:30 P.M. Martindale's force was back at

Cash Corner.16
Throughout Martindale's reconnaissance to Peake's
Station the fighting at Cash Corner had intensified.

Having

discovered Butterfield's brigade around 1:00 P.M., Lane
deployed his regiment and settled into a fire fight with the
much larger Union force.

Lane, however, was taking on too

much in challenging Butterfield, and his regiment began to
suffer heavy casualties.

Captain William H. A. Speer of the

28th NC could only look on as his comrades began to fall in
ever increasing numbers.

After watching the regiment's

color bearer go down, Speer saw a shell fracture both thighs
of a nearby soldier.

Shortly thereafter, Speer witnessed

two more men "killed with shells, taking off the top of one
of their heads & cutting the other [in two] ."l7
As the fight raged on, Butterfield's Federals began to
overlap both flanks of Lane's regiment.

Lane pulled several

15Ibid., 682, 702-3, 694; Boatner, 621.
16OR,

I, 11, pt. 1: 703, 741.

l7Speer, 53.
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companies from his front to meet this threat, but in so
doing he overstretched his line.

With the Federals gaining

his rear, and probing his front, Lane was forced to order a
retreat.

As Lane's regiment began to retire it lost its

cohesion, and became a conglomeration of individual
companies leaving the battlefield at the doublequick.
By 2:00 P.M. Lane's men were in headlong retreat.

In

the confusion one company of the 28th NC failed to receive
the order to withdraw and was eventually captured.18

Lane

also lost one of his artillery pieces, which had to be
abandoned because the horses necessary to withdraw the gun
were either killed or injured.

Finally, in addition to

losing comrades, a gun, and the fight, Lane's soldiers lost
their knapsacks.

Heavy from the rain, these packs,

full of

clothing and personal items, were pulled off during the
engagement and left on the field during the retreat.19
When General Martindale's troops returned to Cash
Corner, Porter's main body was nowhere in sight.

The bulk

of Porter's command was, at that time, pushing Lane up the
Old Church Road toward Hanover Courthouse.

Although uneasy

about leaving Branch's force in his rear, Martindale ordered
his subordinates to follow the division up the road.
Martindale and his men had barely gotten underway when

18George Burgwin Johnston, diary, Box 46.1, in the George
Burgwin Johnston Papers, N.C. Department of Archives and
History, Raleigh.
19OR, I, 11, pt. 1: 744-45.
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orders came from Porter directing them to advance up the
Virginia Central railroad.
a quandary.

Martindale now found himself in

In order to carry out these orders he would

have to march his men back in the direction of the
aggressive Confederates at Peake's Station.

Furthermore,

Martindale was beginning to have second thoughts about
leaving Cash C o m e r at all as there was a Union hospital and
artillery battery still in the area.

At this time General

Morell, the division commander, rode up and ordered one of
Martindale's regiments back to Peake's Station for the move
up the railroad.

A surprised and somewhat frustrated

Martindale acquiesced, but commanded the regiment to march
cross-country to avoid Branch's Confederates.

Then ensued a

mild dispute between Morell and Martindale over the wisdom
of leaving an enemy force in the rear of the division.
Martindale then "asked to be permitted to assume
responsibility of remaining with the Second Maine Regiment
to cover the battery and the column in rear."

Morell

consented and rode off to rejoin Porter.20
Shortly after Morell's departure, Martindale received
word that the Confederates were at the Harris farm.

This

farm was located on the Ash Cake Road, seven hundred yards
west of Cash Corner.

The farm could easily be seen from the

intersection, as they were on opposite ends of the same

“ Ibid., 699, 703-4.
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field.21
With the Confederates in close proximity, Martindale
had precious little time to construct a defensive line.

His

first move was to put the 2d Maine astride the Ash Cake
Road.

While that regiment was getting into position,

Martindale spotted the 44th NY infantry marching up Old
Church Road.

This regiment, which had been on picket duty

south of Cash Corner, was moving to catch up with Porter's
advance.

Martindale hailed the New Yorkers and the section

of artillery accompanying them, and ordered them into his
line.

Then peering back across Old Church Road, Martindale

observed the remnants of the 25th NY resting from its
earlier beating.
regiment,

Although only 150 men remained in the

it also was ordered to move into the developing

Union line.22
Even before the arrival of the 25th NY, Martindale had
constructed a line of approximately 1,500 men.

Martindale's

placement of his regiments was simple, but sound,
considering the haste in which the task was performed.
the right was the 2d Maine.

In the center was Captain

Agustus P. Martin's two pieces of artillery.
held by the 44th NY.

On

The left was

When it arrived, the 25th NY was

designated as artillery support.23

2lIbid., 697, 704; Official Military Atlas of the Civil
War, Map XXI no. 2.
“OR, I, 11, pt. 1: 704, 727-28.
“ Ibid., 704-5, 707; Nash, 351.
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Branch's plan of attack called for the 37th NC to
attack the Federal right while the 18th NC assaulted the
center.

The 7th NC and 45th GA were held in reserve.

Branch's remaining units, the 33d NC and the 12th NC, were
ordered to attack the Union left.

While moving toward their

destination, these last two regiments intercepted a squadron
of the 5th United States Cavalry that was guarding the Union
left flank.

The cavalry, which was deployed in a wood,

began skirmishing with the two Confederate regiments.

As a

result of the delay caused by the Union troopers, the 33d
and 12th NC regiments were not a major factor in Brauich's
attack.34
At roughly three o'clock in the afternoon, the 18th NC
moved forward to engage the Federals

(see Fig. 8).

After

passing through the Harris farm, the 18th, under Colonel
Robert H. Cowaui, deployed in the field which separated the
farm from Cash Corner.

Then, with the regiment's

Confederate National flag snapping in the breeze, Cowan
ordered his regiment to advauice.
Confederates and Federals would later agree that the
advance of the 18th NC was an impressive sight.

Colonel

Charles W. Roberts, commanding the 2d Maine, described the
charge of the Carolinians as bold, and said that it was
conducted "in perfect order."

After advancing four hundred

yards, with bayonets leveled, the 18th halted and unleashed

m OR.

I, 11, pt. 1: 686, 688, 692, 741.
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a volley.

The 2d Maine, which was on the receiving end of

the 18th's discharge, fixed bayonets and responded with a
volley of their own.

The two guns of Martin's section also

opened on Cowan's men.

According to Adjutant William

McLaurin of the 18th NC, the Federal fusillade "did great
damage, and the eighteenth was compelled to move by the
right flank to a wood some two hundred yards to the right,
to get some protection."

After moving to the right, the

18th found itself confronted by the 44th NY.25
During the assault of the 18th NC, General Martindale
could see a force of Confederates moving through the woods
on the north side of the Ash Cake Road.

He correctly

concluded that this body of Confederates, which was in fact
the 37th NC, intended to attack his right flank (see Fig.
8) .

Martindale was now faced with a real problem.

With the

25th NY not yet in position, the only regiment available to
meet this enemy threat was the 2d Maine.

However, moving

that regiment to the right would leave Martin's artillery
unsupported and open to capture.

Pursuing what he felt to

be his only option, Martindale sent a subordinate "to hasten
the march of the Twenty-fifth."

The general also sent his

aide-de-camp to round up stragglers and ambulance guards to
help bolster the threatened flank.

Martindale then spent

the next several minutes anxiously awaiting the arrival of

“ ibid., 709; Walter Clark, ed., Histories of the
Several Regiments and Battalions from North Carolina in the
Great War 1861-65 (Raleigh: State of North Carolina, 1901)
2 : 22.
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the 25th NY.26
When the New Yorkers finally filed into line they did
so under fire from the 37th NC.

Fortunately for the

Federals, dense undergrowth had slowed the 37th's drive
through the woods.

Consequently, as soon as the 25th NY had

assumed its position to the right of Martin's guns, there
was just enough time to rapidly shift the 2d Maine in front
of the Confederates.

The soldiers from Maine promptly faced

to the right, and moved at the doublequick approximately one
hundred yards up the Old Church Road.

Once in position, the

Federals had only to face to the front to once again present
a line of battle to the enemy.27
The redeployment of the 2d Maine put the regiment at a
slight angle with the rest of the Union line.

The Maine

regiment was now located behind a hedge fence.
beyond this fence was the 37th NC.

Twenty paces

The opposing regiments

immediately opened fire at extremely close range.

Colonel

Roberts of the 2nd Maine described the fighting as muzzle to
muzzle.28
The soldiers from Maine suddenly found themselves in a
position where withdrawing would prove as deadly as
fighting.

A captain in the 2d was certain that had the

regiment "fallen back [the Confederates] would have

“OR, I, 11, pt. 1: 704-5.
^Ibid., 705, 716, 741; William Groves Morris Papers,
Folder l, p. 47, Southern Historical Collection, UNC.
“ Ibid., Folder 1, p. 47,* QR, I, 11, pt. 1: 709.
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slaughtered every one of us."29
was also proving costly.

Holding the fence, however,

As soon as the 2d Maine had

reached the fence, the regimental color-sergeant fell to the
ground with a wound.

A sergeant major of the regiment was

moving along the line giving encouragement to the troops,
when he was struck in the face by a bullet that shattered
his ja w .

Another man had an ear shot o f f .

Sergeant

Benjamin Smart was firing and loading as rapidly as possible
when a bullet slammed into his chest.

Smart died moments

later.30
The movement of the 2d Maine succeeded in blocking the
37th NC, but it also exposed the Union center to a severe
crossfire from the right companies of the 37th and the left
companies of the 18th NC.
hard by this fire.

The 25th NY was hit particularly

A major in the 25th later wrote that

" [m] any of the men fell dead and wounded" as a result of the
crossfire.

After several minutes of this punishment Colonel

Charles Johnson gave the order to retreat.

The order had

scarcely left Johnson's mouth when his horse was struck by
four bullets.

A fifth bullet pierced Johnson's leg, and

both horse and rider went down in a heap.31
As the 25th NY streamed to the rear, Martin's artillery
became the object of Confederate musketry.

The Confederates

29Bangor Daily Whig & Courier. 10 June 1862.
^Bangor Daily Whig & Courier. 5, June 1862; QR, I, 11,
pt. 1: 709.
31Ibid., 697-98.
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apparently adopted the common tactic of shooting down
artillery horses in order to prevent the guns from being
withdrawn.

The Union artillerists watched as three horses

fell dead, and two more received wounds.

Uninterested in

making a heroic stand, Martin's men abandoned their two guns
and "retired with the infantry [.] ”32
The 44th NY was the next Federal unit to experience the
deadly enfilade created by the Confederate fire.

While

exchanging volleys with the 18th NC in its front, the
soldiers of the 44th NY became subjected to blasts of
musketry from the 37th NC on their extreme right and rear.
Under this pressure, the right flank companies of the 44th
gave way and retreated in disorder.
General Martindale had been watching the fighting from
a spot some sixty five paces to the rear of the 25th NY.
Without any reserve, there was little he could do to bolster
his line.

Thus, when his center collapsed, Martindale

rushed to halt the retreat.
For a while confusion reigned as Martindale made a
personal attempt to stem the "disorderly movement to the
rear."

Positioning himself in front of the fleeing

soldiers, Martindale called out to his men to rally behind a
nearby fence.

"For a time my orders were not heeded,"

Martindale later reported,

"but presently the men began to

obey my commands, and quite a number came forward" to create

32Ibid., 697-98.
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a line.33
Martindale's makeshift line was never tested.

When the

right flank companies of the 44th NY disintegrated under the
heavy Confederate fire, the bulk of the regiment conducted
an orderly retreat to the Old Church Road.

The regiment

then took cover behind a depression at the side of the road.
From this position the New Yorkers made a tenacious,

and

costly stand which prevented the 18th NC from exploiting the
rout of the Union center.34
The duel between the 44 th NY and the 18 th NC produced
the most intense fighting of the battle.

Although partially

protected by the roadside embankment, the 44th suffered
heavy casualties.

Lieutenant Colonel James Rice later

stated that the Confederate "fire swept through our ranks
like a storm of hail."

Rice spoke from experience; during

the "storm" his horse was shot from under him and his sword
was blown from his side.

Corporal Samuel Chandler o f the

44th was shot five times during the fight (he would die five
days later from his wounds).

Private Lewis Leland received

two head wounds, and had his finger shot off, but continued
to load and fire.

Adjutant Edward Knox was "waving his

sword and cheering on the men . . . when a musket-ball from
the enemy shattered his arm, breaking both bones."

After

using his handkerchief to bandage the wound, Knox returned

33Ibid. , 705, 728.
^Ibid., 730.
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to "encouraging the men to victory till he fainted from
exhaustion.1,35
As was common during the Civil War, the regimental
color guard was a prime target for enemy marksman.

When the

44th's color bearer was shot through the head, Corporal
James Young snatched up the fallen banner.
Young fell wounded.

Moments later

Struggling to his feet. Young once

again picked up the colors, but was immediately killed by a
musket ball.

When yet another soldier raised the flag, he

too was instantly shot down.

After the battle the men of

the 44th would count forty bullet holes in their beloved
flag.36
with the road becoming increasingly "filled with the
dead and dying," the soldiers of the 44th resorted to
desperate measures to hold their position.

Officers

exchanged their swords for muskets, loading and firing as
quickly as possible.

Others went about collecting much

needed ammunition from the cartridge boxes of the dead and
wounded.

" [M]any wounded soldiers loaded muskets . . . for

others to fire."37

When the muskets overheated from

constant firing, precious canteen water was used to cool
them off.
The savage fighting was apparently too much for Colonel

3SNash, 369; QR, I, 11, p t . 1: 731-32.
36Ibid., 731-32; Nash, 75-76, 471.
^OR. I, 11, pt. 1: 731
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Stryker, the commander of the 44th NY.

After volunteering

to go for help, Stryker was reportedly seen sitting quietly
by a tree some distance to the rear (one month later Stryker
would be relieved of duty for misconduct on the field of
battle) .

Fortunately for the 44th NY, Lieutenant Colonel

Rice, who had assumed command of the regiment upon Stryker's
departure, led the troops with bravery and skill.38
The situation was no less difficult for the 18th NC.
In this, the unit's first battle, many of the regiment's
companies suffered fifty percent casualties.

On several

occasions during the struggle the Carolinians attempted to
rush forward in hopes of driving off the 44th NY, but such
surges were promptly thrown back by the Federals.39

Like

Rice across the way, Colonel Cowan of the 18th was highly
involved in his regiment's struggle.

Numerous times during

the battle Cowan was seen emptying his revolver into the
enemy line.

"We trusted in him as a God[,]” confided

Private William Bellamy of his colonel.40

In spite of their

heavy sacrifice in killed and wounded, the men of the 18th
NC could not drive the 44th NY from the road bed.

Wrote one

Carolinian after the war: "Our first experience in war was a
bloody baptism.

'The Bloody Eighteenth' was a well earned

38Ibid. , 731-32; Nash, 75, 86.
39OR, I, 11, pt. 1: 731.
“"From the William James H. Bellamy Diary, 15 May to 2
June 1862, Folder 3, #1559-Z, Southern Historical
Collection, Wilson Library, The University of North
Carolina, Chapel Hill.
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Martindale's units were down to their last rounds when
reinforcements arrived on the battlefield.

Upon learning of

Branch's attack, Porter had ordered his entire column back
to Cash Corner.

By four o'clock, McQuade's Federal brigade

was in position on Martindale's right.

The 14th NY relieved

the 2d Maine while the rest of McQuade's regiments formed
opposite the left flank of the 37th NC (see Fig. 9) -42
When McQuade's brigade rolled forward the 37th NC was
in no condition to offer a stubborn defense.

Falling back

in confusion, the 37th managed to make a couple of brief
stands, but such resistance proved futile against an entire
brigade.

At some point during the retreat, the flag of the

37th was captured by the 9th Massachusetts.

As the

victorious Federals swept the 37th back across the Harris
farm, they captured Branch's field hospital set up inside
the farmhouse.43
When the Federals were reported to be approaching the
hospital, three of the four Confederate surgeons abandoned
their wounded and raced for safety.

"Feeling that this was

useless panic," Surgeon John Shaffner remained and conducted
an evacuation of the wounded.

For his efforts Shaffner was

41Clark, 2 : 22 .
42Ibid. , 682, 700, 720.
43Christian G. Samito, ed., Commanding Boston's Irish
Ninth. The Civil War Letters of Colonel Patrick R. Guiney.
Ninth Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry (New York: Fordham
University Press, 1998), 106-7.
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captured.

That night he witnessed "scenes of anguish and

pain" as he "alone engaged in performing operations

[and]

dressing wounds until 1 o'clock in the morning."44
The 18th NC, having received orders to withdraw from
its battle with the 44th NY, managed to disengage and retire
in a fairly orderly manner.

Branch's claim that his troops

retreated "without haste or confusion" is difficult to
accept.

The Federal reports are unanimous in stating that

the Confederates left the area in a great hurry.

However,

at no time does Branch's brigade appear to have lost its
cohesion, or been affected by panic.
The rear guard action of the 7th NC undoubtedly
prevented Branch from sustaining additional losses during
his retreat.

Positioned astride the Ash Cake Road, the 7th

served as a barrier against the Union pursuit.

When the

Federals came within range, the 7th unleashed a crisp volley
which killed or wounded ten men of the 9th Massachusetts.
After this the Federals opted to chase the Southerners from
a safer distance.45
As McQuade's regiments and Union cavalry pursued the
Confederates westward, Porter sent off a dispatch to
McClellan announcing the Union victory.
immediately wired Stanton the news.

McClellan

Porter's "expedition

promises perfect success in all its objects," proclaimed a

“Louis Shaffner, "A Civil War Surgeon's Diary," North
Carolina Medical Journal 27 (September 1966): 410.
4SOR. I, 11, pt. 1: 742.
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jubilant McClellan in his telegram.46
McQuade's troops followed Branch until sundown, and
then returned to Cash Corner.

There, under a bright moon,

they camped for the night with the rest of Porter's force.
Before going to sleep, one Union artilleryman made a quick
entry in his diary.
first time today.

He wrote: "Saw the enemy's dead for the
Encamped in a wheat field with the dead

and dying all around u s .ntn
Branch's brigade bivouacked near Ashland the night of
the battle.

Three days passed before Lane's 28th NC, which

had retreated to the north of Hanover Courthouse, could make
its way back to the brigade.

When the 28th finally rejoined

the brigade "it was wildly and joyfully received" by its
fellow regiments.

From Ashland, Branch's troops marched

south to join the Army of Northern Virginia around
Richmond.48
In the Battle of Hanover Courthouse, Branch had 80 men
killed,

198 wounded, and 456 captured.

Among the killed of

the 37th NC were three of the regiment's four Robinett
brothers.

Most of those captured had either collapsed from

exhaustion during the retreat, or were somehow cut off from

'“Ibid., 679.
47Nathan Appleton et a l ., comps., History of the Fifth
Massachusetts Battery (Boston: Luther E. Cowles, 1902), 275;
Speer, 57.
48Lane, "Twenty-Eighth North Carolina Infantry," 328-29.
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the brigade.49
Coming on the heels of their defeat at New Bern,
Hanover Courthouse must have been especially frustrating for
Branch and his men.

Some members of the 18th and 37th NC

regiments resented Branch for allowing the two regiments to
carry the fight for the entire brigade.

In a letter to his

wife, John Conrad Thomas of the 37th expressed his desire to
"get out from under Branch's command[.]”
Thomas,

Branch, wrote

"is not by any means a competent man and b y no means

fit for the place he occupies."30 Joseph H. Saunders, of
the 33rd NC, agreed with Thomas.

In a letter home Saunders

stated that Branch's management of the battle did "not
indicate any great care" for the soldiers of his command.31
The criticism of Branch was justified.

Although he had

been heavily outnumbered in the battle, Branch had,
nevertheless, handled his troops with timidity.

Allowing

four regiments to remain virtually idle, while two other
units engaged in desperate battle, was inexcusable.

Luckily

49Casualty reports of the 18th and 28th NC, M a y 1862, in
the G o v e m e r ' s Papers, Box 158, North Carolina Department of
Archives and History, Raleigh; Casualty report of the 37th
NC, Folder 8, in the Adjutant General's Papers, Box 78,
North Carolina Department of Archives and History, Raleigh;
Clark, 1: 609; 2: 654-55.
“ From John Conrad Thomas to wife, 4 June 1862, in the
John Conrad Thomas Papers #1462, North Carolina Department
of Archives and History, Raleigh.
31Joseph H. Saunders to his mother, June 6 1862, File No.
6, in the Joseph H. Saunders Papers, #650, Southern Historical
Collection, Wilson Library, The University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill.
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for Branch, Hanover Courthouse was to be his last
independent command; the day of the battle he was placed
under the direct command of General A. P. Hill.52
The day after the engagement, Porter's troops began the
work associated with winning a field of battle.

Those who

were not busy digging graves collected abandoned equipment.
One Confederate prisoner described the battlefield as being
covered with "dead men, horses, broken wagons, ambulances,
gun carriages - the timber tore all to pieces & ground
busted up - everywhere destruction was visible in every
direction. "53
Porter wasted little time in taking advantage of his
victory.

On May 28, he ordered General Emory to take his

cavalry and destroy the railroad bridge which carried the
Virginia Central Railroad across the South Anna River.

To

carry out the assignment Emory detailed four squadrons of
the 6th United States

(U.S.) Cavalry, along with small

detachments of infantry and artillery.

By the end of the

day, the cavalrymen had successfully destroyed the railroad
crossing, and three other bridges along the South Anna.54
While in the process of destroying the bridges, members
of the 6th U.S. Cavalry made contact with some of McDowell's
advanced scouts.

McDowell's men indicated that they

52OR. I, 11, pt. 3: 554.
53Speer, 58.
^OR. I, 11, pt. 1: 686-87, 692-93.
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expected to be joined by the rest of their corps at any
time.55 This valuable information was promptly sent back to
Porter, who in turn telegraphed McClellan.
news[,]n read Porter's telegram,

"I send you good

" [r]eport says McDowell is

advancing [. ] 1156
Porter's telegram was not necessary.

McClellan arrived

at Cash Corner in the early afternoon of May 28 to
personally survey the battlefield.

Elated by Porter's

victory, McClellan telegraphed additional details of the
Union success to Stanton.

In his message, McClellan

reminded the Secretary of War that it was "the policy and
duty of the Govt

[sic] to send . . . by water all the well

drilled troops available."
troops remain unemployed

" [I]f any regiments of good

[against Richmond] ," warned

McClellan in the last line of the telegram,

"it will be an

irreparable fault committed."57 Then, as suddenly as he had
arrived, and without leaving Porter any additional
instructions regarding a linkup with McDowell, McClellan
returned to his army before Richmond.
Before McClellan's telegram could reach Lincoln and
Stanton, the President sent a message of his own asking for
more information on events in the Hanover area.

"What of

55Porter, "Hanover Court House and Gaines's Mill," in
Battles and Leaders. 2: 322.
“Porter to McClellan, May 28 1862, from the George B.
McClellan Papers, Reel 23, Shelf no. DM 16,004, Library of
Congress, Washington D.C.
^The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan. 279.
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F.J. Porter's expedition?

Please answer." read Lincoln's

telegram.58 Whereas McClellan seemed content that a battle
had been won, Lincoln wanted to extract further results from
Porter's expedition.

Seeing that the way was open to unite

the troops at Fredericksburg with McClellan, Lincoln wired
McDowell and asked if the general's divisions "in front of
Fredericksburg should not push through and join [Porter].n59
Inexplicably, McDowell refused, replying that he did not
think it advisable "to leave Fredericksburg otherwise than
strongly held [. ] ,,6°
That a vital opportunity was about to be squandered was
more than evident to one European observer attached to
Porter's command.

The Prince de Joinville, a pro-Union

Frenchman, was well aware that McDowell's Federals were not
far away.

If the two forces could be united, he felt, the

capture of Richmond would be ensured.

Yet, as the days

passed, and none of McDowell's troops appeared, the Prince
realized that the juncture was not to be.

Grimly, he

predicted that many of the "gallant young men who surrounded
[him]

. . . would pay with their lives for the fatal error

which was on the point of being committed.1,61

58The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, vol. 5, 244.
59Ibid., 245.
“OR. I, 12, pt. 3: 267-68.
6lPrince de Joinville, The Army of the Potomac; Its
Organization. Its Commander, and Its Campaign, trans.
William Henry Hurlbert (New York: Anson D. F. Randolph,
1862), 6 8 .
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On May 29, the 6th U.S. Cavalry continued its
operations along the South Anna (see Pig. 10).

Moving

westward along the river, the regiment destroyed the
railroad bridge over which ran the Richmond, Fredericksburg,
and Potomac line.

Meanwhile, Porter sent the bulk of

Emory's cavalry and Warren's brigade to Ashland.

Ashland

was a small village on the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and
Potomac railroad located roughly six miles west of Cash
Corner.

Union patrols sent there on the 28th had seen

Charles Field's Confederate brigade, of Anderson's division,
passing through the town on their way to Richmond.
Porter's main objective in sending a force to Ashland on the
29th was "to hold in check any [Confederate]

force which

might be detached" from the town to harass the 6th U.S.
Cavalry.

Emory and Warren found only some Confederate

stragglers in Ashland.

They therefore commenced ripping up

railroad track and tearing down telegraph wire.62
Porter's detachments returned to Cash Corner around
mid-day of May 29.

That afternoon, Porter's force marched

back to McClellan's army.

Union losses at Hanover

Courthouse were 64 killed, 221 wounded, and 72 missing for a
total of 357.“
Porter's management of the expedition to Hanover
Courthouse was nearly perfect.

Although taken by surprise

“ Ibid., 683-84, 686, 736-37.
“ Ibid., 685, 1076.
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by Branch's main assault, on May 27, Porter did not panic.
Rather, he handled his troops with skill and confidence.
Unlike many Civil War generals, he exploited his victory to
the fullest by pursuing his defeated foe.

That pursuit

netted several hundred Confederate prisoners too exhausted
to outrun the Union cavalry.

Porter then preyed upon enemy

lines of supply and communication.

Years later, while

looking back on what was Porter's first test as a
battlefield commander, one Confederate veteran of Branch's
brigade described Porter as "a consummate tactician and
sturdy fighter.

. . trained from his youth in the profession

of arms.”62

MClark, 1: 609.
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CHAPTER IV
HANOVER COURTHOUSE AND THE WAR IN VIRGINIA

On May 12, General Robert E. Lee had assured Joseph E.
Johnston that the loss of Hanover Junction would "interrupt
the railroad communication with Generals Jackson and Ewell"
in and around the Shenandoah Valley.

Porter's victory at

Hanover Courthouse, and subsequent attack on the nearby rail
lines, validated Lee's earlier prediction.

Following the

Battle of Hanover Courthouse, all communication between
Richmond and Jackson's army in the valley abruptly ended.
For over a week after the battle Lee was reduced to
communicating with Jackson through letters.

A slow and

inefficient process, Lee's first letter from Jackson was
actually addressed to Johnston, who had been seriously
wounded and replaced by Lee five days earlier.1
Porter's disruption of the railroad also had an effect
upon Confederate supply.

Prior to May 27, Jackson had been

supplied by rail from Richmond.

After Hanover Courthouse

Jackson was obliged to rely on whatever supplies could be
obtained from the limited stockpile in Staunton.
Fortunately for the Confederacy, Jackson habitually captured
enough Union supplies to sustain his men.2

lJohnston was wounded on June 1 at the Battle of Seven
Pines. Command of the Confederate army outside Richmond was
eventually given to Lee. QR, I, 11, pt. 3: 510-11,* 12, pt.
3: 902-8; Johnston, 138-39.
2O R . I, 12, pt. 3: 905.
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The Battle of Hanover Courthouse allowed Porter to
accomplish the goals of his expedition.

After the battle

there were no more Confederate forces between Richmond and
Fredericksburg capable of threatening McClellan's flank or
rear.

Follow-up activities against key railroads and

telegraph lines in the Hanover area cut Confederate lines of
supply and communication between Richmond and the Shenandoah
Valley.

Finally, and most importantly, Porter's victory

ensured that the forces of McDowell and McClellan could be
united without Confederate interference.
The proximity of Porter's and McDowell's troops on May
27, 28, and 29 presented the Union high command with a prime
opportunity to extract critical strategic results from
Porter's expedition.

While in the Hanover area, Porter's

force was roughly twenty-eight miles from McDowell's two
divisions below Fredericksburg.

One day of hard marching

was all that was necessary to bring McDowell's men south to
link up with Porter.

Had the troops below Fredericksburg

been directed to join Porter, the Army of the Potomac would
have been reinforced by twenty thousand men.

From the

Hanover area, those reinforcements would have been perfectly
positioned to flank Richmond's defenses from the north.
That the Confederate high command feared a Union advance on
Richmond from the north betrayed their vulnerability to such
an assault.
Unleashing McDowell's twenty thousand soldiers on
Richmond from the north was the most promising, but
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certainly not the only, advantage of a Union linkup.

Simply

allowing two divisions to remain idle in the Hanover area
was also in the interest of the Union high command.

The

mere presence of such a force astride the Virginia Central
Railroad would have created permanent supply problems for
Confederate armies in the Valley.

That McClellan would have

agreed to implement this strategic measure was ensured by
the President's strict order not to uncover the road to
Washington.

Thus, any possibility of McClellan shifting

these divisions elsewhere for his own purposes was negated.3
The failure to exploit the strategic opportunities
produced by the Hanover expedition was attributable to the
disjointed leadership of the Union high command.

Poor

communication was a major factor in the ineffectiveness of
the Union strategists.

Insufficient, and often confusing

correspondence between Union military leaders during May was
a serious detriment to Union strategy.

McDowell and

McClellan, two generals expected to coordinate their
movements north of Richmond, at no time exchanged meaningful
information regarding their respective roles in the
operation.

When Stanton forwarded McDowell's May 25

telegram which spoke of an advance (actually a
demonstration) beyond Fredericksburg, McClellan erroneously
assumed the reinforcement operation had been resumed.

3OR, I, 11, pt. 1: 28-29.
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McDowell failed to appear, McClellan once again felt wronged
by the Lincoln administration.
Historians have generally listed Lincoln's decision to
send McDowell to the Shenandoah Valley,

instead of

Fredericksburg, as the primary factor in the failure to
unite McDowell and McClellan.

This, however, is a

misconception which assumes that Lincoln's counter directive
of May 24 ended any possibility of moving troops south from
Fredericksburg.

Lincoln never abandoned the plan to

reinforce McClellan.

Even after postponing the

reinforcement operation, Lincoln "constantly intimated" that
McDowell might be directed to "resume [his] advance upon
Richmond."4

Allowing twenty thousand Federals to remain at

Fredericksburg, when they could have been used in the
Valley, is clear evidence of his commitment to the troop
transfer.
Far from withholding the Fredericksburg garrison from
Porter, Lincoln suggested on May 28 that they should "push
through and join him."

The failure to initiate such a move

lay with McDowell, who rejected Lincoln's suggestion.
Lincoln's main fault was in allowing McDowell to do nothing.
Often criticized for interfering too much in military
affairs, Lincoln would have been better served in this

4Congress, Senate, Report of the Joint Committee on the
Conduct of the W a r , pt. 1: 264.
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situation had he imposed his will on McDowell.5
Why McDowell balked when asked to send troops to
Hanover is unclear.

His own explanation claimed that

Fredericksburg would have been left unguarded had he sent
south the divisions of King and McCall.

This excuse,

however, made little sense in that there was no feasible
Confederate threat to the city.

Lincoln, who was always

wary of Confederate threats, was correct in his belief that
it was safe to send King and McCall south to Richmond.
Those divisions served no purpose by remaining at
Fredericksburg.

In fact, their presence below the city was

so useless that the Confederates derisively referred to them
as the "fifth wheel of the coach."6

McDowell, though, was

less concerned about Fredericksburg than he was about
missing out on an operation which promised to redeem his
tarnished reputation.

He therefore sought to delay the

troop transfer until he could once again take an active role
in the operation.
McClellan did not hesitate to blame Lincoln and
McDowell for the failure to unite the two forces at Hanover
Courthouse.

He later claimed that his entire plan to take

Richmond rested upon a linkup with McDowell north of
Richmond.

If that were the case, McClellan should have

pushed Lincoln and Stanton to order McDowell's troops south

S0R, I, 12, pt. 3: 265-68; The Collected Works of
Abraham Lincoln, v o l . 5, 245.
6Prince de Joinville, 68.
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while Porter was in the Hanover area.

He instead demanded,

while standing on the Hanover battlefield,

that

reinforcements be sent to him by water 17
The strategic price that the Union paid for its victory
at Hanover Courthouse had a significant effect on the
outcome of the Peninsular Campaign.

Because McClellan had

not wanted to assault Richmond with Confederate forces
beyond his flank, he had delayed the long awaited assault on
Richmond while Porter was at Hanover.

Had the victory at

Hanover resulted in a more potent Union threat to the
Confederate capital, this delay would have been worthwhile.
As it was, the drive on Richmond had been brought to a halt
for nothing.

Before McClellan could resuscitate his

campaign the Confederates seized the initiative.
The Confederate high command understood the potential
consequences of a linkup between McDowell and McClellan.
Throughout the month of May, General Lee used every means at
his disposal to prevent McDowell from joining the assault on
Richmond.

As the Army of the Potomac closed in on the city

from the east, Joseph Johnston also grew apprehensive of
such a juncture.

When on May 27 Confederate cavalry patrols

reported that McDowell's troops were advancing south from
Fredericksburg, Johnston assumed that McDowell was on his
way to join Porter.

Johnston therefore decided "to attack

[the Army of the Potomac] before it could receive so great

7McClellan, McClellan's Own Story. 375-76.
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an accession."8
News of McDowell's march southward caused Johnston to
abandon his plan to take the offensive by attacking two
Union corps south of the Chickahominy River.

Those two

corps were a prime target because they were separated from
the bulk of the Union army by the Chickahominy.

However, in

order to prevent a linkup between McClellan and McDowell,
Johnston was forced to consider an attack against the main
Federal army which was slowly moving to the north of
Richmond.9

Such an assault was a much more dangerous

undertaking since it would be conducted against a
numerically superior foe.

That McDowell was likely to

reinforce the Army of the Potomac before or during the
ensuing battle created an additional risk for Johnston.
Fortunately for the Confederates, General J.E.B. Stuart's
cavalry discovered that McDowell was not advancing from
Fredericksburg as originally reported.

Johnston therefore

revived his plan to fall upon the exposed Union corps south
of the Chickahominy.10 That assault occurred on May 31, and
was the prelude to a larger Confederate offensive that drove
McClellan back to the James River.
A major outcome of the Union failure to capitalize on
the Battle of Hanover Courthouse was the Confederates'

8Johnston, 130-31.
9Ibid. , 129-30.
10Ib i d ., 132.
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ability to exploit that failure.

During the offensive that

drove McClellan away from Richmond, Jackson's army was
brought from the Valley to attack McClellan.

The Virginia

Central Railroad provided Jackson easy access to McClellan's
right flank.

Departing from the railroad at Ashland,

Jackson's command inarched directly across the Hanover
Courthouse battlefield on their way to attack the Army of
the Potomac (see Fig. 11) .

The presence of twenty thousand

Union troops in the Hanover area could quite possibly have
negated the subsequent attack of Jackson's sixteen thousand,
but most of those Union troops were still at Fredericksburg.
The consequences of the failure to exploit the victory
at Hanover Courthouse were in every way negative for the
North.

In squandering the opportunity presented to them,

the Union high command committed a variety of blunders.
Poor communication and strong-willed generals were mostly to
blame.

Shrewd Confederate strategy only added to the

confusion which dominated Union affairs in Virginia in May
of 1862.

U0R. I, 11, pt. 2: 552.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS

For two years after the Peninsular Campaign the Union
high command struggled to get the Army of the Potomac back
to where it had been in May, 1862.

In June of 1864, that

army did approach Richmond once again.

However, in 1864

many of the leading officers who had helped direct the
Peninsular Campaign were no longer with the army.

This was

particularly the case with those officers which had been
involved in the strategic failure north of Richmond.
For Irvin McDowell the chance to redeem his reputation
never came.

Nevertheless, McDowell made every effort to

clear himself of any criticism concerning the botched effort
to reinforce McClellan from Fredericksburg.

On June 27,

1862, the same day Jackson's forces broke McClellan's lines
southeast of Hanover Courthouse, McDowell defended his
actions during May before the Joint Committee on the Conduct
of the War.

Several times during the questioning McDowell

accused the newspapers and McClellan's friends of unfairly
castigating him for not moving south from Fredericksburg.1
Not surprisingly, he did not mention that he refused
Lincoln's suggestion to send King and McCall to meet Porter
at Hanover.
McDowell was involved in most of the battles which

‘Congress, Senate, Report of the Joint Committee on the
Conduct of the War, pt. 1: 267-68.
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raged over northern Virginia in the summer of 1862.

After

receiving much criticism for his performance in those
campaigns, McDowell was relieved of command.

Although he

demanded a court of inquiry to clear him of any misconduct,
his career as a battlefield commander was over.

McDowell

held several minor administrative positions, and finished
out the war on the West Coast.
After Hanover Courthouse, Fitz-John Porter commanded
his corps through the Confederate offensive that drove the
Army of the Potomac from before Richmond.

As the main

object of General Lee's attacks, Porter's corps was engaged
in a disproportionate amount of the fighting.

Throughout

the ordeal, Porter commanded his troops with the same skill
and boldness that he had demonstrated at Hanover Courthouse.
Yet, what appeared to be the rise of an outstanding general
was actually the twilight of Porter's short military career.
In January, 1863, he was cashiered for failure to obey the
orders of General John Pope during the 2nd Bull Run
Campaign.

Fifteen years later a president-appointed board

of officers reviewed Porter's court-martial, and recommended
that the guilty verdict be reversed.

Eight years after the

review, a Congressional act officially exonerated Porter of
all charges.
of colonel.

On August 5, 1886, he was reappointed to rank
Two days later Porter retired from the army.2

2Kevin Donovan, "The Court-Martial of Fitz-John
Porter, " Columbiad.- A Quarterly Review of the War Between
the States. 2, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 74,* Boatner, 662.
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George B. McClellan's military career fared little
better than that of McDowell or Porter following the Battle
of Hanover Courthouse.

In August of 1862, after being

driven from Richmond by General Lee's Confederates,
McClellan's army sat inactive along the James River.
Lincoln, thoroughly exasperated with McClellan's style of
leadership, turned to General John Pope to defeat the
Confederacy's eastern army, but without success.

In late

summer, Lincoln called on McClellan one last time to repel a
Confederate advance into Maryland.

On September 17,

McClellan fought Lee to a bloody stalemate at the Battle of
Antietam.

Almost two months later McClellan was relieved of

command for his deliberation in attacking the Confederates.
In December of 1862, McClellan was called as a witness
in the investigation of McDowell's conduct during the year.
When the subject of Hanover Courthouse and the reinforcement
operation was raised, McClellan spoke without inhibition.
"It is . . . my opinion," he declared,

"that had the command

of Gen. McDowell joined the Army of the Potomac in the month
of May, by way of Hanover Court House from Fredericksburg,
we would have had Richmond in a week after the junction."3
After leading Union forces in some of the largest and
bloodiest campaigns of the Civil War, McClellan still
harbored frustration over what could have been after the

3W . J. Tenney, The Military and Naval History of the
Rebellion in the United States (New York: D. Appleton &
Company, 1865), 228.
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little battle at Hanover Courthouse.
In sharp contrast to his Union counterparts, Lawrence
O'Bryan Branch experienced a dramatic improvement in his
military career following Hanover Courthouse.

As part of

Ambrose P. Hill's famous Light Division, Branch and his hard
luck brigade were involved in one Confederate victory after
another during the summer of 1862.

At Antietam, Branch's

brigade participated in a dramatic assault that drove
McClellan's troops from a breach in Lee's line, and ended
the battle.

While observing the Federal retreat, Branch was

struck and killed by one of the last bullets to be fired on
the bloodiest day in American military history.
Civil War historians have consistently failed to
recognize the importance of the Hanover expedition on the
war in the Virginia theater in 1862.

In his 468 page study

of the Peninsular Campaign, Stephen Sears devoted only two
and a half pages to a general discussion of the Battle of
Hanover Courthouse.4

Rowena Reed, T. Harry Williams, and

James McPherson each neglected to even mention Hanover
Courthouse in their written evaluations of strategy in the
Virginia theater.

Significantly, the latter three

historians have contributed to the misconceptions which have
arisen concerning the failure of the Union effort to unite
McDowell and McClellan north of Richmond.
In Lincoln and His Generals T. Harry Williams

4Sears, 114-17.
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maintained that McClellan's unwillingness to act decisively
would most likely have negated any advantages obtained by
uniting McDowell with the Army of the Potomac.

This

argument, however, ignored the benefits of keeping twenty
thousand Union troops at Hanover to sit astride the rail
lines between Richmond and Fredericksburg.

Williams also

failed to recognize the likelihood that the attack Johnston
planned to carry out against McClellan and McDowell, after
Hanover Courthouse, would have hurt the Confederates more
than the Federals.5

Thus, the Union's ability to extract

strategic benefits from a juncture of McDowell and McClellan
was not reliant upon the latter's willingness to attack
Richmond.
Reed's work entitled Combined Operations of the Civil
War lends support to the common misconception that Lincoln
was to blame for the failure to send McDowell to Richmond.
Portraying Lincoln as obsessed with trapping Jackson, Reed
inaccurately claims that the President required the Army of
the Potomac to wait until Jackson was captured before he
would allow McDowell to reinforce McClellan.

Yet, Lincoln's

suggestion to McDowell on May 28 that the two divisions at
Fredericksburg be sent to meet Porter stands as stark
evidence against Reed's assertion.6
McPherson, in his Battle Crv of Freedom, presented

Williams,

103.

®Reed, 172-73.
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conclusions in line with, the contentions of both Williams
and Reed.

McPherson criticized Lincoln's decision to send

McDowell to the Valley instead of Richmond, and suggested
that the President's "strategic error [was] perhaps even the
colossal blunder that McClellan considered it."

McPherson,

though, does not offer further analysis of the potential
strategic drawbacks of Lincoln's supposed mistake because
McClellan's "previous record offered little reason to
believe that he would have moved to . . . capture
Richmond.1,7
The arguments of these historians miss the point
because they attempt to evaluate Union strategic failure in
terms of mistakes made by Lincoln, or McClellan's cautious
approach to warfare.

A true understanding of why the North

failed to seize the great opportunity to ionite the forces of
McClellan and McDowell can only be obtained by analyzing the
ineffectiveness of the Union high command in directing
Federal strategy between Richmond and Fredericksburg.

Time

and again, historians studying the Virginia theater in 1862
have restricted their focus to operations south of Richmond,
where events of true significance were in fact rare prior to
May 31.

When such studies reached the point where

McClellan's Peninsular Campaign came to a halt before
Richmond, historians have invariably shifted their attention
to Jackson's Valley Campaign.

That the former campaign

7McPherson, 460.
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fizzled, and the latter was initiated because of the
strategic struggle between Richmond and Fredericksburg has
been overlooked.

As a result, the Battle of Hanover

Courthouse, which was the climactic episode in that
struggle, has been treated as an irrelevant sideshow of
McClellan's campaign against Richmond.
The Battle of Hanover Courthouse was the high water
mark of the Union's Peninsular Campaign.
turning point in the war in Virginia.

It was also a key

Before Hanover

Courthouse the North controlled events around Richmond;
after the battle, and for the remainder of 1862, it
constantly reacted to Confederate actions.

Porter's

expedition produced a decisive tactical victory, which in
itself produced significant strategic opportunities.

Yet,

because of the ineffectiveness of the Union high command,
those strategic opportunities went unexploited.

As feared

by the Prince de Joinville, thousands of lives, and a great
deal of time, would be required to regain the ground which
Fitz-John Porter had won at the Battle of Hanover
Courthouse.
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